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INTRODUCTION
Since Rochet and Tirole’s (2003) seminal paper “Platform competition in 
two-sided markets”, a rich literature about winner-takes-all dynamics in 
multisided platforms has developed 1. The latter are defined as platforms 
that operate in “markets in which one or several platforms enable inter-
actions between end-users, and try to get the two (or multiple) sides ‘on 
board’ by appropriately charging each side” (Rochet & Tirole, 2006). Some 
authors argue that in these markets the presence of high switching costs, 
the impossibility or irrelevance of product differentiation and notably the 
existence network effects in digital platforms, lead to winner-takes-all 
dynamics, which poses a threat to competition (Geradin & Kuschewsky, 
1 We will employ along this paper the term “multisided platform” to refer to businesses 
that are multisided, as the term “multisided market” is ambiguous: sometimes it is 
used to refer to these businesses and sometimes to refer to the markets in which they 
operate.
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2013; Graef, 2015). Other authors, in turn, have criticized this view by pro-
viding arguments that minimize the importance of these factors (Sokol & 
Comerford, 2016; Evans & Schmalensee, 2017).
The surge in the late 2000s of the so-called ‘sharing economy’ platforms, 
which have been identified by many authors 2 as multisided platforms 
in which the platform is digital, as well as the growth of other types of 
digital multisided platforms (social media, music streaming, e-shopping, 
etc.), has revived the discussion on competitive issues related to multi-
sided platforms. The debates have taken two principal directions. On the 
one hand, scholars, the media and antitrust agencies have taken an inter-
est in allegations of unfair competition practiced by new entrant sharing 
economy platforms to the detriment of traditional firms in some markets 
(e.g. Airbnb and hotels, Uber and taxis, etc.). On the other hand, focus-
ing on the (anti)competitive effects of access to data, the discussion on 
the existence of winner-takes-all dynamics in multisided platforms has 
reemerged and new arguments have been made by both opponents and 
supporters of this view.
This paper falls within the latter discussion in the specific context of ride-
hailing platforms, which are digital multisided platforms with two sides: 
drivers and riders. Its aim is to show that, in the specific case of ride-hail-
ing platforms, there are sound theoretical arguments and some empirical 
evidence to support the view that the appearance of ride-hailing plat-
forms is creating winner-takes-all dynamics in ride-hailing markets. In 
doing so, we intend to contribute to remediate what we consider to be 
two weak points of the debate on winner-takes-all dynamics in multisided 
platforms. On the one hand, most of the debate has revolved around (digi-
tal) multisided platforms in general. This ignores the specificities of each 
type of (digital) multisided platform, which results in general conclusions 
that draw questionable parallels between heterogeneous businesses (social 
media, lodging platforms, music streaming platforms, credit cards…) in 
which competitive dynamics, although sharing common traits proper to 
multisided platforms, vary considerably. On the other hand, mostly due 
to a lack of data, there have been scarce empirical contributions to the 
debate on the existence of winner-takes all markets. 
2 See Lougher & Kalmanowicz (2016); Demary, (2014); Hagiu & Wright, (2015) and 
Evans & Schmalensee (2013).
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 argues that ride-hailing mar-
kets are becoming winner-takes-all for two reasons: product differentia-
tion is not very relevant to carve out market niches and indirect network 
effects are particularly strong in ride-hailing apps, especially because 
they are enhanced by the user “data snowball effect” to a larger extent 
than in other digital platforms. Section 2 provides an empirical corrobo-
ration of these findings that builds on available data from the main cit-
ies of the United States. After defining the relevant market of ride- hailing 
platforms, we compare the existent data to show that, as expected in 
 winner-takes-all markets, the market shares of a single firm (Uber) have 
been increasing to the detriment of that of its competitors’. Finally, we 
show that Uber’s strategy to conquer these markets seems to be based on 
predatory pricing and we suggest three ways in which Uber might recoup 
its losses from predation.
1. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RELEVANCE OF 
FACTORS LEADING TO WINNER-TAKES-ALL 
DYNAMICS IN MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS IN 
THE CONTEXT OF RIDE-HAILING
The literature (Kouris & Kleer, 2012; Chen & Tse, 2008) has identified four 
factors that lead to a winner-takes-all dynamic in multisided platforms, 
namely: strong direct network effects, strong indirect network effects, dif-
ficulty or irrelevance of differentiation between platforms and difficulty 
of multi-homing in at least one side of the market. Moreover, another fac-
tor proper to digital platforms in general, the “data snowball effect” (the 
fact that access to a larger amount of data by a platform helps it improv-
ing its services, which in turn attracts more users), has been put forward. 
In this section, we will present each of these factors and assess to which 
extent they apply to ride-hailing platforms.
1.1. Network effects and the ‘data snowball effect’
Multisided platforms are characterized by the existence of indirect net-
work effects: the number of users on one side of the market increases the 
utility of the platform for users on (the) other side(s) of the platform. In 
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some multisided platforms such as social media platforms, there are also 
direct network effects: the more users there are on one side of the mar-
ket, the more attractive the platform becomes to users on that side of the 
market. For example, the more Twitter users there are, the more attractive 
Twitter becomes not only for advertisers (indirect network effects), but 
also for users, as they can reach a wider audience and interact with more 
people (direct network effects). 
In ride-hailing apps, direct network effects do not exist, since the number 
of users in one side of the market does not increase the utility of the plat-
form for users of that side. There can even be (short-lived) relative rivalry 
between users of the same side: given a number of drivers in a certain ter-
ritory, the more riders there are on the platform, the more each rider will 
have to wait to get a ride. Moreover, because most ride-hailing apps recur 
to surge pricing, the more each rider will have to pay. Inversely, given a 
certain number of riders in a certain territory, the more difficult it will 
be for each driver to get a ride and the lower the price of the ride will be. 
Nevertheless, the existence of indirect network effects offsets this tem-
porary rivalry. Given that one of the main features of ride-hailing plat-
forms is, as in any multisided platform, to put in touch individuals from 
two sides of a market, the utility of the platform for a user of one side of 
the market (riders) always depends positively on the size of the other side 
of the market (drivers). If this effect is strong enough, it can create a ten-
dency for users to converge to a single platform once it has reached a crit-
ical mass of users in at least one side.
Moreover, some authors claim that in digital platforms such as ride-hail-
ing platforms indirect network effects are enhanced by the “user feedback 
loop” (Graef, 2015) or “data snowball effect”, as the French and German 
antitrust agencies call it (Autorité de la Concurrence & Bundeskartellamt, 
2016). This effect consists in the fact that the more users a platform has, 
the more attractive it becomes for users, but not because of network effects. 
The reason is the existence of a “user feedback loop”: “as a platform gains 
more users, it can collect more user data, leading to better insights into 
consumers and their needs, which can be used to improve quality, attract-
ing even more users” (Sokol & Comerford, 2016). This link between user 
activity data and the quality of the service is explained by the technical 
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properties of the use of big data. Algorithms not only need large amounts 
of data to function, they also need it to improve. Once an algorithm (or, 
more generally, a model) is correctly designed to fit its data 3, the more 
data it can work on, the more likely it will be that it will improve over 
time. Then, the ‘algorithm race’ becomes a matter of who has more data. 
As the famous quote by Google’s Chief Scientist Peter Norvig goes, “we 
don’t have better algorithms than anyone else; we just have more data”. 
Consequently, “the acquisition of large volumes of data by ‘first mover’ 
providers may, however, raise barriers to entry and thus deprive users 
from the benefits of competition” (Geradin & Kuschewsky, 2013).
On the same line, a report commanded by the French government on tax-
ation of the digital economy points out that “all digital economy firms use 
data to improve their supply, obtain productivity gains, diversify their 
activities or reinforce their position on the different faces of the business 
model” 4 (Collin & Collin, 2013).
Taking into account the data snowball effect, we can expect the existence 
of a tipping point in which a ride-hailing platform would have a dataset 
on user activity that would be substantially larger than its competitors’. 
When that tipping point is met, competitors would be unable to compete 
on quality. This is all the more important that the literature stresses that 
offering a high quality service is more relevant than being the first mover 
for a firm to enjoy the benefits of network effects in multisided platforms 
(Rangan & Adner, 2001; Liebowitz, 2002; Iansiti & Zhu, 2007). 
Some authors have warned that, as a result, winning firms might obtain 
and exert market power. In Kestenbaum opinion, “if the information nec-
essary to compete on equal footing is not readily available from alterna-
tive sources, the potential competitive harm from data-driven entry 
barriers raises a cognizable theory of competitive harm under the anti-
trust laws” (Kimmel & Kestenbaum, 2014). In that sense, as the OECD (2014) 
has observed referring to companies in general (which does not limit to 
3 For a more detailed explanation of under which conditions does more data improve 
a model, see Amatriain, X.(2015), “Machine Learning, What is Better: More Data 
or better Algorithms.” Available at http://www.kdnuggets.com/2015/06/machine-
learning-more-data-better-algorithms.html
4 The translation is ours.
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ride-hailing platforms) and echoing Tim O’Reilly’s words (Bruner, 2013), 
“where companies acquiring massive proprietary data sets there is thus a 
higher risk that we’re kind of heading toward data as a source of monopoly 
power” (OECD, 2014). In the particular case of ride-hailing platforms, the 
lawsuit filed against Uber for using a software called Hell 5, which allowed 
it to track drivers that were also working for its main American competi-
tor Lyft in order to target economic incentives to them so that they would 
work less for Lyft, is a telling example of how important observed data can 
be to secure a competitive advantage. Indeed, the data obtained through 
Hell allowed Uber to practice price discrimination on the drivers’ side of 
the market in order to reduce multi-homing and, therefore, to conquer that 
side of the market. It is important to point out that firms can lawfully col-
lect and treat personal data because users give their consent to it when 
agreeing to the general terms and conditions of use of the app. Moreover, in 
countries covered by the European General Data Protection Regulation ride-
hailing firms can also argue that the treatment of this personal data is nec-
essary in terms of their “legitimate interest” (e.g. providing a good service).
Following this logic, we should expect ride-hailing markets to be winner-
takes-all markets. Indeed, once the above-mentioned tipping point would 
be reached by a winning platform, it would be difficult for potential com-
petitors to challenge its position by offering a service of similar or higher 
quality because of the large asymmetry in the accumulation of the neces-
sary data that would play in favor of the winner. In addition, this mech-
anism reinforces over time: the more users a platform has and the longer 
they have been using the platform, the stronger the data snowball effect 
becomes and the larger the amount of user activity data needed to contest 
the market becomes. 
Nevertheless, not all scholars agree with the idea that indirect network 
effects enhanced by the data snowball effect can lead to winner-takes-all 
dynamics in ride-hailing markets. In the following lines, we will develop 
the arguments that have been put forward in the literature to contest 
this claim 6 and provide counter-arguments. As we will see, because these 
5 Michael Gonzales v Uber Technologies, Inc, Case 3:17-cv-02264-JSC, U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California. 
6 We will follow Sokol & Comerford’s (2016) and Evans & Schmalensee’s (2017) papers 
since they cover vastly the criticisms that have been made in the literature to win-
ner-takes-all dynamics in multisided platforms.
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arguments have been formulated to apply to any multisided platform, 
they are seldom pertinent when the specificities of ride-hailing platforms 
are taken into account.
First, it has been argued that in multisided platforms it is not the number 
of users on each side that counts the most, but the quality of the match 
between users of each side because “most customers on most platforms 
are not very good matches for each other” (Evans & Schmalensee, 2017). 
Nevertheless, this is hardly the case in ride-hailing platforms, where a good 
match is essentially a nearby rider/driver, as “waiting time is an essential 
feature of the quality of ride hailing platforms” (Herrera Anchustegui & 
Nowag, 2017). Then, the more riders/drivers there are on the platform in 
a given territory, the more likely it will be for a nearby driver/rider to 
demand/offer a ride. Moreover, the probability of a good match happening 
depends also on the capacity of the matching algorithm to predict which 
areas will see a rise in demand and, accordingly, nudge drivers to go there 
by increasing the price of rides in the area and/or providing benefits (e.g. 
bonuses or granting more rides), as the above-mentioned case about Uber’s 
use of the software Hell shows. In order to do a proper prediction, ride-
hailing apps recur to past data on how drivers and riders have interacted in 
the platform (McLean, 2016). Therefore, the accumulation of large amounts 
of data by one firm can lead it to secure a competitive advantage that can 
only increase over time as the data snowball effect keeps operating.
Second, following Tucker and Wellford (2014) and Lerner (2014), Sokol and 
Comerford argue that “online providers can gain scale in users in ways 
that do not involve user data, and that access to data alone is not enough 
to improve quality and gain scale in users. Additionally, firms can gather 
data from other sources than users (e.g. data brokers), and can gain scale 
in data in alternative ways, such as entering into strategic distribution 
arrangements” (Sokol & Comerford, 2016). The problem with the first part 
of the argument is that in ride-hailing platforms quality, as explained 
above, depends much more on access to large datasets on user activity 
than in other digital platforms. Contrary to what happens in other digi-
tal platforms, differentiation plays a smaller role and takes place largely 
within platforms, while the service they offer does not have any original 
content aspect, nor does it rely on the platform’s identity 7. Moreover, the 
7 We will develop this argument in subsection 1.3.
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quality of the match, which essentially comes down to matching nearby 
drivers with nearby riders, also depends on the availability of past data. 
Then, the quality of the service depends highly on the performance of 
algorithms, which in turn relies on the availability of large datasets on 
past user activity that allow their perfection. The second part of the argu-
ment is difficult to hold in ride-hailing platforms. To our knowledge, there 
are no data brokers that could sell relevant data to entrant ride-hailing 
firms. Moreover, we have to be careful on what data we are talking about. 
The most relevant data for a new ride-hailing entrant firm is data on how 
users interact within competing incumbent platforms. Contrary to other 
data-driven businesses such as search engines, the data collected by ride-
hailing platforms about their users’ activity cannot be obtained without 
platforms’ consent. For data brokers to have access to it (which, to our 
knowledge, is not the case for ride-hailing user data), they would need 
to buy it from ride-hailing platforms. It is difficult to imagine why an 
incumbent ride-hailing platform would sell that valuable data to a data 
broker that could in turn make a profit by selling it to its competitors. 
A third similar argument offered by Sokol and Comerford is that “data is 
ubiquitous, inexpensive, and easy to collect (Tucker 2013)” because “cus-
tomers leave multiple digital footprints on the internet (Lambrecht & 
Tucker 2015)” (Sokol & Comerford, 2016). While this is true for data in gen-
eral, it is not the case when it comes to the specific data a new firm would 
need to challenge incumbent ride-hailing platforms. The digital footprints 
that are useful to new entrants are mostly located in proprietary data-
bases owned by incumbents. If, for example, a platform cooperative like 
Juno wanted to capture a significant market share from Uber and Lyft in 
the United States, it would need large amounts of data of users’ trips in 
those platforms, not any data. 
The fourth argument is that data is non-exclusive and non-rivalrous. In 
other words, “collection of a piece of data by one firm does not occur at 
the expense of another firm” (Sokol & Comerford, 2016). This claim con-
fuses the technical properties of data with the legal rights applied to it, 
while in fact economic properties of data are the combined result of the 
two. Data being non-exclusive and non-rivalrous depends on what data we 
are talking about. It is true in the case of personal information. For exam-
ple, a person can provide information about his/her birthplace to two 
competing platforms. However, it is not true for most of the relevant data 
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new entrants would need to compete in a ride-hailing market. Following 
our previous example, if Uber has information about a certain amount 
of trips users did using its application, Juno will never be able to collect 
that same data to improve its algorithms because Uber’s exclusive intel-
lectual property rights over the database that contains that data and/or 
its right to use trade secret to keep the data away from competitors gives 
it a legal right to exclude Juno from its use. In other words, intellectual 
property and trade secrecy can create rivalrousness where technical con-
ditions do not.
The fifth argument is that “data has a limited lifespan – old data is not 
nearly as valuable as new data – and the value of data lessens considerably 
over time” (Sokol & Comerford, 2016). This assertion is taken from Chiou 
and Tucker’s paper (2014), which investigate search engines. There is no 
reason to consider it holds in the case of ride-hailing platforms. On the 
contrary, as said before, it is precisely past data that allows algorithms to 
perform an effective matchmaking between drivers and riders.
The sixth argument is that “the possession of data alone therefore, even 
in large volume, does not secure competitive success – that can only be 
achieved through engineering talent, quality of service, speed of inno-
vation, and attention to consumer needs” (Sokol & Comerford, 2016). 
Similarly, Evans and Schmalensee (2017) argue that multisided platforms 
“have to figure out how to get all sides on board in order to create any 
value at all”. This is certainly true, but it does not imply that the lack 
of large amounts of data cannot be a barrier to entry for newcomers in 
ride-hailing markets. New entrants may overcome this barrier by offer-
ing a very good service, but that does not mean the barrier does not exist. 
Moreover, it should be pointed out that this argument, backed in Evans 
and Schmalensee’s (2017) article by the example of Youtube, is weaker in 
ride-hailing platform than in content-based platforms or social media 
platforms. While some platforms effectively rely heavily on their distinc-
tive features to engage users to participate, the decision to choose a par-
ticular ride-hailing platform depends mainly on short waiting times and 
low prices for riders and income opportunities and flexible working hours 
(a feature every ride-hailing platform and taxis share) for drivers (Chen 
et al., 2017; Ridesharing Guy, 2018). These, in turn, depend largely, for users 
of each side of the platform, on the number of users on the other size of 
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the platform, as well as on the matchmaking-improving data that having 
many users on both sides of the platforms generates.
Finally, Evans & Schmalensee (2017) argue that indirect network effects 
are a double-edged sword because they can work in reverse. The argu-
ment is that, since switching costs are low, once a better platform enters 
the market, users start multi-homing and eventually drop the first (dom-
inant) platform to join the new one, which leads to an exponential decline 
(inverse network effects) in the number of users of the first platform. The 
authors recall the examples of social networks (AOL, Friendster, MySpace, 
Orkut and Yahoo), mobile providers (Blackberry and Microsoft), search 
engines (AltaVista, Infoseek and Lycros) and browsers (Microsoft) that suf-
fered from reverse network effects to back their argument. Although we 
agree on the fact that switching costs are rather small in ride-hailing apps 
and multi-homing is easy (cf. subsection 1.2), we believe this argument does 
not hold properly in the case of ride-hailing apps. As said above, contrary 
to social networks, mobile providers, search engines and browsers, prod-
uct differentiation plays a small role in ride-hailing apps and it even takes 
place within the platforms that have the largest users bases. Consequently, 
the attractiveness of a new ride-hailing platform relies vastly on its capac-
ity to offer low prices and short waiting times to riders and higher income 
for flexible working hours than competing platforms. Then, the capacity 
of a dominant platform to avoid reverse network effects relies mainly on 
its financial capacity to keep rides’ prices lower and drivers’ income higher 
than in competing platforms. This attracts each side of the market sep-
arately in the first place and activates indirect network effects also by 
reducing riders’ waiting time as the number of drivers increases. Then, as 
long as the dominant platform is able to obtain more funds than compet-
ing platforms for a certain period, it will have high chances of avoiding 
suffering from reverse indirect network effects. As we will see in the next 
section, this seems to be the case of Uber and its American competitor Lyft.
1.2. Switching costs and multi-homing
Let us now analyze the possibility of multi-homing in ride-hailing plat-
forms. “Multi-homing, whereby suppliers and/or users participate in 
more than one platform, similarly lessens the ability of platforms to exer-
cise market power, amounting to a form of countervailing buyer power” 
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(Dunne, 2018). The main reason why multi-homing can be hindered in 
ride-haling platforms is the existence of strong switching costs. The latter 
exist when users refrain from switching to a competing platform because 
of the (usually non-monetary) costs it implies. In ride-hailing platforms, 
switching costs can be divided into three categories: learning costs (learn-
ing how the app works), bureaucracy-related costs (paperwork such as 
background checks, proof of insurance needed to join the platform, etc.) 
and ‘reputational costs’ (the cost of losing the reputation that has been 
accumulated in another platform).
Reputational costs, as in many so-called ‘sharing economy’ platforms, are 
not negligible in ride-hailing apps, especially for drivers, for which ratings 
have an important effect on the income they can make through the plat-
form. In Uber, drivers whose rating goes below 4.6/5 are expelled from the 
platform. In Lyft, only drivers with a high rating can work for Lyft Lux, 
a luxury version in which rides are more expensive. Moreover, drivers 
with higher ratings are more likely to get more rides in every ride-hailing 
app. It is important to point out that reputational costs increase over time 
because, the longer users have been using a platform, the more solid their 
reputation score is. Therefore, the more experience they collect in a plat-
form, the higher the cost of losing their reputation becomes. Reputational 
costs and the obstacles to multi-homing they entail are the consequence 
of users not enjoying data portability (Van Gorp & Honnefelder, 2015). 
Then, it follows that “switching costs would be reduced further if con-
sumers were assured data portability between platforms.” (Perzanowski & 
Schultz, 2010)  8. Consequently, the lack of data portability limits competi-
tion in ride-hailing markets (Autoritat Catalana de la Competència, 2016). 
Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that reputational switching costs are 
lower for users that join a competing platform before having cumulated a 
considerable amount of ratings in another one.
Learning costs, on the contrary, seem to be negligible. Riders and drivers 
are used to a dynamic market of applications and platforms and can adapt 
8 Nevertheless, this would only be the case if a user were able to migrate all data 
submitted by him/her (volunteered data) and all the data referring to him/her. In 
that sense, as many commentators have pointed out (De Hert and Papakonstantinou, 
2016) the recent article 20 of the European Union General Data Protection Regulation 
is insufficient, because it only allows volunteered data portability. Reputation scores 
fall outside of the scope of this new European regulation on data portability.
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without much inconvenience to new platforms. Riders will not hesitate to 
switch to a competing platform if prices and waiting time are lower, and 
drivers will do the same if more and/or better-paid rides can be obtained. 
Moreover, as mobility-as-a-service apps combining several transportation 
services (including sometimes even rival ride-hailing apps, as in the case 
of Go La, in which both Uber and Lyft are present) and offering passen-
gers real-time information, trip planning, booking, ticketing, and pay-
ment functionalities (CIVITAS, 2016) develop, multi-homing between 
ride-hailing platforms through a MaaS platform will become increasingly 
easy and usual.
Bureaucracy-related switching costs come down to requirements that driv-
ers have to meet to join the platform due to both platforms’ self-regulation 
and government regulation. Examples of bureaucracy-related costs include 
background checks, vehicle inspection and proofs of insurance. Although 
these switching costs are non-negligible, it should be noted that they are 
similar across platforms, even if some platforms are more exigent than 
others. Consequently, although they do represent an entry cost for drivers, 
they are rarely a switching cost: once drivers incur into these bureaucracy-
related entry costs, they do not have to incur into most of them once again 
to join a competing platform.
We can conclude that switching costs are relatively low in ride-hailing 
platforms and that they affect considerably more the drivers’ side of 
the market than the riders’. In accordance with this conclusion, studies 
show that it is common for drivers and riders to practice multi-homing 
(Choudary, Parker & Van Alystne, 2015).
1.3. Product differentiation
The literature on multi-sided platforms shows that product differentia-
tion can offset winner-takes-all dynamics. In this sense, following Schepp 
and Wamback (2015), Sokol and Comerford argue that “online platforms 
are highly differentiated, even in the provision of the same type of ser-
vice” and that “each entrant carves out a niche” (Sokol & Comerford, 2016). 
Nevertheless, when it comes to ride-hailing platforms, differentiation 
plays a smaller role in attracting users than in other types of online plat-
forms because the room left for differentiation is small. 
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When discussing differentiation, the literature on multi-sided platforms usu-
ally recurs to examples in which the originality of the content or the iden-
tity of the platform is crucial such as newspapers (a certain type of subjects 
treated, an editorial line, a writing style), social networks (a certain way of 
interacting online with other people) or night clubs (a certain aesthetic, a 
certain musical style). In the case of ride-hailing platforms, there is no origi-
nal content and the identity of the platform is anecdotal. The key role of the 
platform is the provision of a transportation service in which differentiation 
plays a smaller role because it is reduced to mainly three variables: luxuri-
ousness of the vehicle, available passenger seats on the vehicle and sharing 
or not sharing the ride with other passengers traveling along the same route. 
Consequently, it is hard to carve out a niche in ride-hailing platforms through 
differentiation because the possibilities of differentiation are limited.
Moreover, precisely because differentiation possibilities are limited, plat-
forms practice within-platform differentiation to make sure they can reach 
each type of user and adapt to users with swinging needs by offering them 
differentiated versions of the same service. Indeed, the two main American 
ride-hailing apps, Uber and Lyft, offer a very similar bundle of services that 
differ between each other in terms of the three variables mentioned above. 
Both Uber and Lyft have a baseline option that seats up to four passengers 
(Uberpop and Lyft), a minivan or SUV that seats up to six passengers (Uber 
XL and Lyft Plus), a cheaper option that pairs users with other passengers 
traveling along the same route (uberPool and Lyft Line), a luxury black ser-
vice (Uber Black and Lyft Lux) and a luxury SUV or minivan service (Uber 
SUV and Lyft Lux SUV). We conclude that limited and mimetic within-plat-
form differentiation makes of differentiation less of a competitive advan-
tage to carve out a niche in ride-hailing platforms than in other multisided 
platforms: users can find more or less the same variants of the baseline 
product regardless of the ride-hailing platform chosen.
2. SOME EVIDENCE ON WINNER-TAKES-
ALL DYNAMICS IN AMERICAN RIDE-HAILING 
MARKETS
Having discussed the literature on winner-takes-all dynamics in multi-
sided platforms, we have shown that there are two main reasons to expect 
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winner-takes-all dynamics in ride-hailing platforms. On the one hand, 
product differentiation, contrary to what happens in other multi-sided 
platforms, is not very relevant to carve out market niches. On the other 
hand, indirect network effects are particularly strong in ride-hailing plat-
forms, especially because they are enhanced by the user “data snowball 
effect” to a larger extent than in other digital platforms. In this section, 
we will take a step towards corroborating our theoretical findings by con-
trasting them to some data on ride-hailing markets. 
In order to do so, we will provide some (rough) evidence that supports our 
thesis by focusing on Uber, a platform that seems to be conquering the 
main ride-hailing markets of the United States. This choice responds to 
two criteria. The first one is the availability of data. The data required to 
analyze the existence of a winner-takes-all dynamic in ride-hailing mar-
kets is currently scarce and incomplete. Nevertheless, in the case of Uber 
and its competitors, some scattered sources of data that will help us in this 
endeavor are available. Although imperfect, the available evidence offers 
some interesting insights. Second, the United States is a country in which 
Uber faces severe competition from Lyft, a company it has engaged in a 
price war with (cf. subsection 2.2). This makes the choice of this country a 
challenging and ideal test of our theoretical findings. 
It should be noted that, as described along the section, the available data 
is incomplete and in some cases imperfect. It is therefore unfortunately 
insufficient to arrive to sound empirical conclusions, especially regarding 
implications for antitrust. Nevertheless, we have decided to include empir-
ical elements because they will allow us to provide a corroboration of our 
theoretical findings of Section 1 that, although imperfect, represents a con-
tribution to the literature on winner-takes-all dynamics in multisided plat-
forms, which remains highly theoretical and relies on anecdotal evidence 
on disparate digital platforms (social media, ride-hailing, dating apps, etc.).
2.1. Market definition and market shares
We will begin by analyzing the evolution of market shares. If, as we claim, 
ride-hailing markets are becoming winner-takes-all markets that Uber is 
conquering, we should observe an increasing gap over time between Uber’s 
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market share and its competitors’ in favor of the former. In order to so, we 
need to define the relevant product and geographic market in which Uber 
participates. 
The definition of the relevant product market is particularly difficult in 
multisided platforms. Traditional approaches based on defining the prod-
ucts that are part of the relevant market and those that are not “are 
particularly likely to obscure market realities” in the case of multisided 
platforms (Evans and Noel, 2005), since competition does not take place 
in a single-sided market over a product or a range of products. Because 
the aim of defining a relevant market is to understand the factors that 
constraint business behavior and to assess the contours of competition of 
a firm, a more fruitful approach for ride-hailing platforms (and for mul-
tisided platforms in general) consist in identifying sources of competi-
tion constraints (Evans and Noel, 2005). Based on the analysis of Uber’s 
business model made in the recent “Uber Spain Opinion” 9, Dunne (2018) 
argues that Uber’s market is the underlying services market (the ride-
hailing service market) rather than a niche intermediation market. In 
this market, consistently with the findings of the literature on market 
definition in multisided platforms, firms compete to attract users on both 
sides of the market (Evans and Noels, 2005; Dunne, 2018). On the riders’ 
side, two types of Uber competitors can be identified: other ride-hailing 
platforms (the main and only national one in the United States being 
Lyft) and other non-platform-based ride-hailing services, out of which 
the most relevant ones are taxis. Two reasons have been put forward by 
United Kingdom’s Competition Market Authority in Sheffield City Taxis/
Mercury Taxis 10 to justify this definition of competitors: (i) the similar-
ity of the basic intended use of “private hire transport services” (a cate-
gory that includes ride-hailing platforms and hailed taxis); and (ii) the 
fact that, as shown by internal documents and third party comments 
in the case, private hire operators “have regard to taxi tariffs when set-
ting prices” (Competition Policy International, 2018). On the drivers’ side 
of the market, given that the number of taxi licenses is limited by reg-
ulators and their price is too onerous for the vast majority of Uber and 
9 Opinion in C-434/15 Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi (‘Uber Spain Opinion’) EU:C:2017:364.
10 ME/6548-15; Completed acquisition by Sheffield City Taxis Limited of certain assets 
and business of Mercury Taxis (Sheffield) Limited, Decision of 13 October 2015. 
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Lyft drivers 11, taxis are not to be considered as relevant competitors. In 
other words, ride-hailing platforms do not compete with taxis for drivers 
because ride-hailing apps’ drivers can very rarely become taxi drivers, 
and taxi drivers can only lose income by becoming ride-hailing drivers.
Regarding the relevant geographic market, Uber’s markets are circum-
scribed to a territory, typically a city or a metropolis. There are two 
reasons for this. First, ride-hailing firms with vehicles located in two 
different territories would be too far away from each other to be able to 
compete on price or in terms of waiting time for the passenger. Second, 
as stated by the Competition Commission of India in Meru Travel Solutions 
Private Limited v. Uber India Systems Private Limited, “the radio taxis services 
market is largely regulated by the State transport authorities. Thus, the 
conditions of competition appear to be homogenous only in a particular 
city/State” (Competition Commission of India, 2015, p. 10). In that vein, as 
stated in a report from the European Commission on ridesharing, taxis 
and hire markets, “the taxi market is also geographically fragmented since 
the licenses are usually valid only for the territory of the issuing munici-
palities” (European Commission, 2016, p. 8).
Having defined Uber’s relevant product and geographic market, we should 
begin by studying the evolution of its market shares. Two preliminary 
observations need to be made in this respect. First, because, as said above, 
Uber competes over users on both sides of the platform (drivers and rid-
ers), ideally, the measurement of market shares should be done on both 
sides: the share of rides and the share of full-time equivalent drivers of 
each competitor. Unfortunately, there is no such available data on driv-
ers. Therefore, we will have to limit our analysis to measurements of mar-
ket shares that only consider the riders’ side of the market. Nevertheless, 
ceteris paribus, unless mean waiting time increases considerably, because 
of the existence of indirect network effects, an increase in a firm’s rid-
ers’ market share will translate into an increase in its drivers’ market 
share. Otherwise, average waiting time would increase because of conges-
tion effects, which would in turn reduce riders’ market shares as passen-
gers shift to competitors with lower mean waiting times. Then, although 
11 A recent study by the MIT (Zoepf et al, 2018) shows that, in the United States, 74% of 
Uber and Lyft drivers earn less than the minimum wage in their state.
IS RIDE-HAILING DOOMED TO MONOPOLY? THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM THE MAIN U.S. MARKETS
59R E V U E D’ÉC O N O MIE IND U S T R IE L L E ➻  N ° 16 2  ➻  2 E T R IME S T R E 2 018
we will not be able to measure drivers’ market shares, we can make con-
clusions about their dynamics (and not their magnitudes) by looking at 
how the riders’ market shares evolve 12. This is not very problematic as 
what we need to corroborate is if there is a widening gap between Uber’s 
and its competitors’ market shares over time. Second, although calcula-
tions of Uber’s market shares on the riders’ side of the market exist, they 
generally define the market narrowly, as most of them consider either 
Lyft or taxis as the other market participant and not the two, while some 
measurements include both of them. Given that data sources are scarce, 
we will use each source for a different purpose. Sources that define the 
market properly (with both Lyft and taxis as competitors) will be used 
to show that Uber’s market share is increasing steadily in detriment of 
both taxis’ and Lyft’s. Sources that define the market narrowly (i.e. by 
considering either Lyft or taxis as Uber’s only competitor) will be used to 
show the increasing gap between Uber’s and one of its competitors’ num-
ber of rides or revenues in a certain territory. The numbers taken from 
these sources should not be interpreted as correct measurements of mar-
ket shares, but rather as pieces of evidence that, although insufficient by 
themselves, support our theoretical findings in Section 1 regarding win-
ner-takes-all dynamics in ride-hailing markets.
When we look at the existing evidence on Uber’s market share properly cal-
culated (i.e. when both taxis and Lyft are taken as market participants), 
they all show that Uber is on its way to dominating the market. By com-
bining different data sources on 1.1 billion trips in New York, and taking 
Uber, Lyft, Green Taxi and Yellow Taxi as market participants, Schneider 
(2016a) finds that between May 2015 and September 2016 13 Uber has stead-
ily increased its market share measured in number of trips much more 
rapidly than Lyft and to the detriment of Yellow Taxi’s. It follows from 
this tendency shown in Figure 1 that Uber is on its way to dominating 
the New York City market, including every borough (Brooklyn, Queens, 
Manhattan, Bronx and Staten Island) and airport trips.
12 It is interesting to point out that none of the current or past antitrust cases involv-
ing ride-hailing apps has estimated market shares on the riders’ side of the market, 
as they have not adopted the theoretical framework of multisided platforms.
13 This timeframe, like all the other timeframes used to calculate the other market 
shares that will be presented in this section, are not the most pertinent to draw con-
clusions by any means. Lacking additional sources of data to calculate market shares, 
we have no option but to take these numbers knowing they present limitations.
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Figure 1. New York monthly pickups –May 2015 and September 2016
 
Source: Schneider (2016a)
The same tendency is verified when the analysis is narrowed down to 
each borough (Schneider, 2016b) and airports: Uber’s market shares grow 
exponentially, Lyft’s grow at a decelerating pace and taxis’ fall. 
This tendency is corroborated by analyses that show that the gap between 
Uber and taxis in terms of number of rides increases over time. Using 
data provided by the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, 
Fischer-Baum & Bialik (2015) estimate that between 2014 and 2015 Uber’s 
share of pickups has increased by 12 percentage points for the April-June 
period in New York City counting all the boroughs. The same tendency 
is observed by Certify (2015) for business travelers in all main cities of 
the United States during the first quarter of 2015. Nelson (2016), in turn, 
finds that since Uber and Lyft started operating in Los Angeles, taxi rides 
have declined by 30% over three years (2012 to 2015). Similarly, “in San 
Francisco, the corporate home of both Uber and Lyft, the number of trips 
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taken per taxi dropped by more than two-thirds over a two-year period” 
(Nelson, 2016).
Finally, calculations that only take into consideration Uber and Lyft as 
market participants show that Uber is taking an increasing share of the 
trips and the revenues taxis are losing to ride-hailing apps. A report from 
7Park that compares the (miscalculated) market shares of these two plat-
forms by revenue shows that Uber’s market share was considerably larger 
in the twenty main U.S. cities in the second quarter of 2016. During that 
period, its market share varied from 62% to 83% depending on the city 
(7Park, 2016). This is in line with the (optimistic) claim Uber made to its 
investors in August 2016 according to which its market share (which only 
includes other ride-hailing apps as market participants) in the U.S. was 
between 84% and 87% (Bloomberg Technology, 2016). If we turn now to 
the evolution of the gap between Uber and Lyft, we corroborate what is 
expected in a winner-takes-all market: it widens over time in favor of the 
winner (Uber). Using anonymized credit and debit card spending data of 
a sample of 3.8 millions of users, a report by FutureAdvisor shows that, 
between June 2013 and September 2014 Uber’s revenue has increased 10 
to 11 times faster than Lyft’s in absolute terms. In the same period, Uber 
has increased its number of rides 6 to 7 times faster than Lyft in absolute 
terms (FutureAdvisor, 2014). Moreover, during that period 82,000 people 
used Uber, while only 14,200 people (5.8 times less) used Lyft. 
We can conclude that the available figures of the main United States ride-
hailing markets, although certainly imperfect and incomplete, point out 
in the same direction: Uber is increasing its market share to the detriment 
of both taxis’ and Lyft’s. These market shares, although not large enough 
to raise suspicions of dominance neither by European (above 40% of the 
market) or U.S. (65% market share being “doubtful”) antitrust standards 
(Dunne, 2018) when both taxis and Lyft are taken as market participants, 
are evolving in favor of Uber and to the detriment of its competitors, as 
expected in winner-takes-all markets. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that even if these market shares were large, they would not necessarily be 
indicative of market power. Market shares provide an indication that may 
be disproved by other factors. Moreover, dominance is not problematic per 
se, as it can be based on merits and it does not necessarily imply a harm 
to competition. In the next section, we will study Uber’s behavior in the 
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main U.S. markets to argue that the increase in its market shares are the 
result of a predatory pricing strategy that can only be rational if ride-hail-
ing markets are winner-takes-all markets in which, once Uber becomes 
the winner, it will gain market power, which will allow it to recover the 
losses induced by predation.
2.2. Signs of Uber’s predatory pricing strategy aimed 
at securing a winner-takes-all ride-hailing market
We have seen so far that Uber’s market shares are increasing exponen-
tially to the detriment of Lyft’s and taxis’. What strategy is it employing 
to get there? On the riders’ side of the market, Uber has expanded by sys-
tematically cutting fares in more and more cities every January for three 
years in a row since 2014. In that year, it did so in 16 of its 24 US cities. 
In 2015 it cut fares in 48 cities and in 2016 in 100 cities. While this boosts 
demand, it decreases the size of the drivers’ side of the market, since driv-
ers earn money by getting a cut of the fare charged to riders. Moreover, 
Uber has been increasing the commission it takes from drivers, lower-
ing so drivers’ revenue per trip. Until 2014, Uber’s commission was 20%. 
It then rose to 25% and it is as high as 30% in some cities. In addition, 
Uber started charging flat fees to drivers in 2014, the amount of which 
began at 1 dollar and is now as high as 2.5 dollars in some cities (Bloomberg 
Technology, 2016). To avoid losing drivers, Uber has started offering them 
bonuses, incentive programs and earning guarantees. It is worth noting 
that the conditions that drivers need to meet to be eligible to these bene-
fits make it almost impossible for them to work for other platforms at the 
same time (i.e. to practice multi-homing). In other words, Uber has been 
systematically subsidizing both sides of the market.
As a result of this strategy, Uber has been reporting losses since its foun-
dation in 2009. In 2015 it lost 2 billion dollars and in the first half of 2016 
it lost 1.27 billion dollars. Uber’s former head of finance, Gautam Gupta, 
claimed that subsidies to drivers explain the majority of the company’s 
losses (Bloomberg Technology, 2016). Nevertheless, Uber has been able to 
raise increasingly large amounts of funds.
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Figure 2. Uber’s vs Lyft’s cumulated funding (in million US dollars)
Source: own elaboration based on www.crunchbase.com
As Figure 2 shows 14, Uber raised 3,700 million dollars in 2015 (equivalent 
to 185% of the losses of that year) and 4,850 million dollars in 2016 (equiv-
alent to 328% of its mid-year losses) and 9,000 million dollars in 2017. In 
August 2016, Uber’s valuation was set at 69 billion dollars, a number that 
seems astronomical (roughly 35 times the value of Uber’s yearly losses of 
the past 2 years!) considering the company has been making losses for 
9 years in a row since its foundation.
These trends indicate that Uber, which has no other substantial source 
of revenue but the commission it takes on each trip, is engaging in pred-
atory pricing to conquer a winner-takes-all market. Predatory pricing 
requires two conditions to be met. The first one is a firm pricing below 
“an appropriate measure of its cost” (Passaro, 2018, p.42), typically aver-
age variable costs or average total costs, depending on the case (OECD, 1993, 
p. 156; European Commission, 2002, p.37). The second one is a dangerous 
14 The numbers shown in Figure 2 do not include the funding rounds with undis-
closed figures that took place in the following periods. For Uber: December 2011, 
February 2015, April 2017 and January 2018. For Lyft: April 2014, October 2016 and 
December 2017.
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probability of recoupment of the costs of pricing below cost. In the par-
ticular case of multisided platforms, pricing below cost takes place when a 
firm makes losses over the whole platform (Evans & Schmalensee, 2007), 
and not over the most elastic side of the market, since multisided plat-
forms’ pricing schemes are characterized by one side subsidizing the other 
one. This seems to be the case with Uber, which systematically cuts fares 
(riders’ side of the market) and gives bonuses, incentive programs an earn-
ing guarantees to drivers (drivers’ side of the market) and, as a result, has 
been making losses over the whole platform for 9 years. This strategy ech-
oes traditional predatory pricing models based on financial constraints 
in which, as long as a firm can secure more financial resources than its 
rivals to sustain a price war long enough, it will be rational for it to prac-
tice predation (Roberts, 1985). As Figure 2 shows, Uber benefits from con-
siderable financial asymmetries in respect to Lyft: being a year younger, 
Uber has been able to secure about four times more funds than its main 
American rival. Moreover, Uber’s last valuation has been estimated at 70 
billion dollars, while Lyft’s has been estimated at 11 billion dollars 15. More 
specifically, Uber’s price war with Lyft is a textbook example of a “pocket 
picking” or “cross-subsidizing” strategy in which “to discipline a price-
cutter in one geographic market, a firm operating in several geographic 
markets can undercut the chiseler in one market and recoup the resulting 
losses from other market revenue” (Dugger, 1985, p. 348). Indeed, Uber is 
present in about 777 cities in 72 countries, while Lyft is present in around 
600 cities in only two countries (United States and Canada) 16. Far from 
being a United States phenomenon (a country in which there are five 
ongoing litigations accusing Uber of practicing predatory pricing 17), pred-
atory pricing strategies take place in other countries’ ride-hailing mar-
kets. In Asian markets, Uber left the market after losing a price war with 
Grab (South East Asia), on the one side, and Didi (China), on the other side. 
15 Last valuations available on 13 May 2018.
16 Estimates based on data from Quartz Index (https://index.qz.com/1088078/lyft-is-
in-600-cities-in-the-us-with-uber-out-of-the-way-london-could-be-next/) and Uber 
estimator (https://uberestimator.com/cities).
17 A White and Yellow Cab, Inc., No. 4:15-cv-05163, Doc. 114 at 14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2018); 
Miadeco Corp. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-20356, Doc. 120 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 
30, 2017); Ariekat v. Uber Technologies, Inc., CGC-17-557728 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 
2017); Friendly Cab Company, Inc. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., RG-17-858247 (Cal. Sup. 
Ct. April 27, 2017); Malden Transp., Inc. v. Uber Technologies, Inc. , 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 213023 (D. Mass. 2017).
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In both cases, as stated recently by Raphaël Morel, Uber’s Head of City 
Development in France 18, Uber left these markets because it did not have 
as many financial resources as its competitors to survive the price war. 
Then, because price wars are likely to persist or even multiply in other 
markets around the world, the success of a pocket picking strategy based 
on operating in several geographic markets is not likely to last. There 
would be not enough profitable markets to recoup the losses if one con-
siders that Uber has already been making losses overall for 9 years while 
engaging in price wars in the United States, South East Asia and China. 
The only possible explanation of Uber’s predatory pricing strategy is that, 
consistently with our analysis in Section 1, investors are providing enough 
funds for Uber to be the winner of a winner-takes-all market in which it 
will eventually be able to make up for the losses of the previous years by 
levering on its (future) dominance of the markets conquered. Uber would 
be able to recoup the losses of predation in three combinable ways. 
First, once it dominates a ride-hailing market, it could raise prices, like the 
Chinese ride-hailing app Didi did once it won a price war to Uber in China 
(Beijing Review, 2016). To do so, it could rely on its competitive advan-
tage in terms of quality that the data snowball effect, as explained above, 
would give it. Nevertheless, Uber’s capacity to raise prices in ride-hail-
ing markets will be limited by their contestability. Given that entry is not 
costly both in regulatory (in most American cities ride-hailing platforms 
are not banned and there are no restrictions to the number of vehicles 
they can work with) and financial (the cost of developing an app and pro-
viding basic support functions and marketing) terms, we can expect Uber 
not to raise prices to deter competition. As shown by the literature initi-
ated by Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1984) seminal work, when entry is endog-
enous, a (future) leader will always find it optimal to adopt a “top dog” 
strategy consisting in overinvesting to reduce its price below the price 
of its competitors in order to gain a larger market share, limit entry and 
reduce its average cost of production (Cato & Oki, 2011; Etro, 2006, 2007). 
Then, we can expect Uber to maintain its future dominance by overin-
vesting in offering drivers bonuses, incentive programs and earning guar-
antees that prevent them from multi-homing and allow Uber to lower 
18 Statement made during the conference « Plateformes et territoires » organized by 
the Cities and Digital Technology Chair of Sciences Po on May 3rd 2018 in Paris.
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consumer prices without reducing drivers’ revenues, maintaining so its 
future dominance over the riders’ and the drivers’ sides of the market. 
Second, it can use its dominance over ride-hailing markets to make prof-
its in other markets, even while keeping prices low enough to deter 
entrance in ride-hailing markets. This option is particularly likely if Uber 
is expected to adopt a top dog strategy in which overinvesting entails pric-
ing below cost instead of reducing costs. Indeed, drivers’ incentives do not 
increase productivity and they increase Uber’s marginal and average cost. 
One way of profiting from its dominance in ride-hailing markets to create 
revenue in other markets is to use the data generated there to gain a com-
petitive advantage in a market in which competition takes place through 
innovation. This is what Uber is currently doing by using ride-hailing 
data to develop artificial intelligence software that will allow it to enter 
the autonomous vehicle (software) market. Given that the amount of data 
is a crucial factor affecting the speed of innovation in artificial intelli-
gence, Uber’s driving and traffic data, which amounts one billion kilo-
meters driving per month worldwide (Durand, 2017), is a precious asset. 
Indeed, Uber has acquired in 2016 the autonomous vehicle startup Otto for 
680 million dollars and launched an autonomous vehicle research hub in 
Toronto in 2017. That same year, the company spent 1.17 billion in research 
and development, much of which has been devoted to autonomous-driv-
ing technology. This figure is significant in terms of Uber’s strategic 
choices, since it represents a quarter of its losses that year -4.5 billion- 
(Newcomer, 2018). Another option is selling data or data analytics to third 
parties. As stated by Andrew Salzberg, Head of Transportation Policy and 
Research at Uber, the company is “actively looking in a bunch of differ-
ent directions to be able to share data in different ways and for different 
purposes” (Marghall, 2018). A first step in that direction has been taken 
with Uber’s Movement Platform, which opens certain aggregated data for 
free. The platform has been successful in awakening city halls’ interest. 
We can expect this to grow into a traffic analytics service based on the 
amounts of data collected through ride-hailing that can interest public 
agencies. This revenue model is in line with the multiplication of agree-
ments between Uber and municipal governments, metropolitan planning 
organizations and transit agencies to complement or replace transit ser-
vices that is taking place since 2016 in the United States (Schwieterman, 
Livingston & Van Der Slot, 2018).
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Finally, Uber could recoup its losses by following a business group struc-
ture similar to that of the Chinese net giants Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu, 
in which “the different platforms can both feed one another and be lev-
eraged to expand into other business areas” (Jia & Kenney, 2016) by cross-
feeding traffic to other platforms and using cross-platform personal data 
to customize offers. Uber has given a first step in this direction by diversi-
fying into a food delivery platform, Uber Eats, a service to drive patients to 
medical appointments (Uber Health) and, similarly to Chinese net giants, 
a credit card offering a cashback reward program and other incentives.
CONCLUSION
Ride-hailing markets have been disrupted by the emergence of multi-
sided platforms. After having discussed all the existing arguments for and 
against the existence of winner-takes-all dynamics in the multisided plat-
forms literature, and having provided some novel arguments, we have 
shown that there are strong reasons to argue that ride-hailing markets are 
winner-takes-all markets. The reasons are that, although switching costs 
are not relevant in ride-hailing platforms, product differentiation plays 
a smaller role than in other multisided platforms and indirect network 
effects, enhanced by the data snowball effect, are particularly strong.
We have also provided some empirical corroboration of our theoretical 
findings, which represents a contribution to the literature discussing win-
ner-takes-all dynamics in multisided platforms. Indeed, this literature 
has been so far merely theoretical and only recurred to scarce anecdo-
tal evidence that conflates heterogeneous multisided platforms such as 
social media, dating apps or e-commerce. We have shown that the existing 
evidence regarding ride-hailing markets in the United States, although 
scarce and not without methodological shortcomings, points out to a win-
ner-takes-all dynamic: Uber’s market shares have been increasing expo-
nentially, while Lyft’s have been increasing at a decreasing pace and taxis’ 
are decreasing sharply. This seems to be the result of a predatory pricing 
strategy: Uber has been subsidizing both sides of the market (drivers and 
riders) and, as a result, has been making losses over the whole platform for 
nine years. Nonetheless, its funding, which allows it to sustain this strat-
egy, keeps growing exponentially. This supports the view that Uber is on 
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its way to conquering a winner-takes-all market and that, if it succeeds, 
it will be able to use its dominance to recoup the losses of predation. We 
have suggested three complementary ways in which Uber can recover its 
losses: raising prices, using the data obtained in ride-hailing markets to 
develop autonomous vehicles and sell transit data analytics and following 
a business group structure. These results invite researchers and competi-
tion agencies to pursue research on competitive dynamics in multisided 
platforms narrowed down to a specific type of platform and producing 
more complete and precise empirical evidence. 
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